Abstract. In this paper, we rst show that there are several equivalent keys for t + 1 chosen plaintexts if the degree of the reduced cipher is t?1. This is against the claim by Jakobsen and Knudsen. We also derive an upper bound on the number of equivalent last round keys for t + 1 chosen plaintexts. We further show an e cient method which nds all the equivalent keys by using Rabin's root nding algorithm. We call our attack root nding interpolation attack
Introduction
Consider a Feistel type block cipher of block size 2n with a round function F(K; x). For a xed key K, F(K; x) can be viewed as a polynomial f K (x) in x over GF(2 n ). The interpolation attack 4] succeeds if deg f K (x) is small for any K and the number of rounds is not large. More precisely, suppose that the degree of the reduced cipher is t ?1, where the degree of the reduced cipher will be de ned in Def.2.1. Then 1. Jakobsen and Knudsen claimed that the last round key K m can be recovered from t + 1 chosen plaintexts (see 4, Theorem 3]). 2. They used exhaustive search to nd K m .
On the other hand, given a polynomial f(x) over GF(p), Berlekamp proposed a probabilistic algorithm of nding a root 2 GF(p) of f(x) = 0 for any odd prime p 1]. Rabin generalized Berlekamp's algorithm to any nite elds 8].
In Rabin's algorithm, the expected number of bit operations to nd a root of f(x) = 0 over GF(2 n ) is O(n 2 dL(d)L(n)); where d = deg f(x) and L(n) = log n log log n.
In this paper, we rst show that for t + 1 chosen plaintexts, there are several equivalent keys. This is against the claim by Jakobsen and Knudsen 4, Theorem 3]. We also derive an upper bound on the number of equivalent last round keys for t + 1 chosen plaintexts.
We next show an e cient method which nds all the equivalent last round keys K m . We call our attack root nding interpolation attack because it uses Rabin's root nding algorithm 8]. By using more than t + 1 chosen plaintexts, we can uniquely determine K m .
Further, Jakobsen and Knudsen claimed that the number of necessary chosen plaintexts can be smaller than t + 1 if they use the meet in the middle approach 4]. However, the number of equivalent keys increases if the number of chosen plaintexts decreases in general. Therefore, their claim cannot be justi ed. For this problem, we derive another upper bound on the number of equivalent last round keys for a certain number of chosen plaintexts which is less than t + 1. The round function F operates as follows. 
Reduced cipher assumption
We say that : (2) for some polynomial f 1 (x) over GF(2 n ) such that deg f 1 (x) t ? 1. 2. A block cipher satis es the second reduced cipher assumption of degree u ? 1 if the right halfŷ R of the second reduced ciphertext can be expressed aŝ
for some polynomial f 2 (x) over GF(2 n ) such that deg f 2 (x) u ? 1. If h 1 (x) = 1, then h(x) has no roots in GF(2 n ). In general,
Lagrange interpolation
where the i are the pairwise di erent roots in GF(2 n ) of h(x) = 0.
On the other hand, the trace function is de ned as
Tr(x) = x + x 2 + + x 2 n?1 :
For any 2 GF(2 n ), it is known that Tr( ) = 0 or 1:
Rabin rst proved the following proposition Proposition 3.1. For any xed 1 6 = 2 2 GF(2 n ), choose r 2 GF(2 n ) randomly. Then
Pr(Tr(r 1 ) 6 = Tr(r 2 )) = 1 2 :
Rabin next showed the following root nding algorithm.
Let h 0 (x) = h 1 (x).
Step 1. If deg h 0 (x) = 1, then we have found a root. Otherwise goto step 2.
Step 2. Choose r 2 GF(2 n ) randomly. Compute h r (x) = gcd(h 0 (x); Tr(rx)):
Step Therefore, it can be shown that 8] the expected number of bit operations is
where L(n) = log n log log n:
4 Equivalent keys and root nding interpolation attack
In this section, we rst show that for t + 1 chosen plaintexts, there are several equivalent keys. This is against the claim by Jakobsen and Knudsen 4, Theorem 3]. We also derive an upper bound on the number of equivalent last round keys for t + 1 chosen plaintexts.
We next show an e cient method which nds all the equivalent keys. We call our attack root nding interpolation attack because it uses Rabin's root nding algorithm 8]. By using more than t + 1 chosen plaintexts, we can uniquely determine K m .
For a plaintext (x L ; x R ) = (x i ; 0), let (y L;i ; y R;i ) denote the ciphertext, (ỹ L;i ;ỹ R;i ) denote the reduced ciphertext and (ŷ L;i ;ŷ R;i ) denote the second reduced ciphertext.
Key equation
In this subsection, we derive a key equation 
On the other hand, from eq. (1), it holds that y R;i = F(K m ; y R;i ) + y L;i : (6) Substitute eq. (6) In fact, the interpolation attack must require more than t+1 chosen plaintexts to uniquely determine K m . If the round function F(K; x) is not algebraically constructed, the situation is worse because d is usually large. In this case, there are many equivalent keys for t+1 chosen plaintexts and the interpolation attack will require many chosen plaintexts to uniquely determine K m .
Root nding interpolation attack
We propose an attack which e ciently nds all the equivalent keys K m by solving eq.(8) by using Rabin's algorithm of Sec.3. By using more than t + 1 chosen plaintexts, we can uniquely determine K m . We call this attack root nding interpolation attack. Step 2. Solve eq.(8) by using Rabin's algorithm of Sec.3. Then we obtain d or less equivalent keys K m .
Next suppose that some extra (chosen plaintext, ciphertext) pairs are available. Then the set of equivalent keys is made smaller and we can nally uniquely determine K m . An alternative way is as follows. Obtain two key equations h i (K m ) = 0 for i = 1; 2 from t+2 chosen plaintexts. Compute gcd(h 1 (K m ); h 2 (K m )). If K m is uniquely determined from the gcd, then we have done. Otherwise, execute the same procedure for more chosen plaintexts. 5 On the meet in the middle approach Jakobsen and Knudsen also claimed that the number of necessary chosen plaintexts can be smaller than t + 1 if they use the meet in the middle approach 4]. However, the number of equivalent keys increases if the number of chosen plaintexts decreases in general. Therefore, their claim cannot be justi ed.
In this section, we derive an upper bound on the number of equivalent last round keys for certain number of chosen plaintexts which is less than t + 1.
Suppose that there exists a block cipher which satis es the second reduced cipher assumption of degree u ? 1 and K polynomial assumption of degree d. 
Root nding resultant attack
We propose an attack such as follows which we call root nding resultant attack.
First suppose that u + 2 chosen plaintext/ciphertext pairs are available such that the plaintexts are (x 1 ; 0); : : : ; (x u+2 ; 0) and the ciphertexts are (y L;1 ; y R;1 ), : : : ; (y L;u+2 ; y R;u+2 ). Then
Step 1. Compute the coe cients of H 1 and H 2 from x 1 ;: : : ;x u+2 and (y L;1 ;y R;1 );
: : : ; (y L;u+2 ; y R;u+2 ). Step 2. Compute h(K m ) = R(H 1 ; H 2 ).
Step 3. Solve h(K m ) = 0 by using Rabin's algorithm of Sec.3. Then we obtain 2d 3 or less equivalent keys K m .
Next suppose that some extra (chosen plaintext, ciphertext) pairs are available. Then the set of equivalent keys is made smaller and we can nally uniquely determine K m . We can also have an alternative method similarly to Sec.4.3.
Example
The m round PURE cipher 4] is de ned by letting F(K; x) = (K + x) 3 over GF (2 32 ). Q.E.D.
In this paper, we rst showed that for t + 1 chosen plaintexts, there are several equivalent last round keys if the degree of the reduced cipher is t ? 1. This is against the claim by Jakobsen and Knudsen on interpolation attack 4, Theorem 3]. We also derived an upper bound on the number of equivalent last round keys for t + 1 chosen plaintexts.
We next showed an e cient method which nds all the equivalent last round keys K m . We call our attack root nding interpolation attack because it uses Rabin's root nding algorithm 8]. By using more than t + 1 chosen plaintexts, we can uniquely determine K m .
The number of equivalent keys increases if the number of chosen plaintexts decreases in general. For this problem, we derived another upper bound on the number of equivalent last round keys for a certain number of chosen plaintexts which is less than t + 1.
As an example, we showed that the m round PURE cipher has two or less equivalent last round keys for 3 m?3 +2 chosen plaintexts and 54 or less equivalent last round keys for 3 m?4 + 3 chosen plaintexts. The proposed attack e ciently computes all the equivalent keys K m by solving a key equation h(K m ) = 0 over GF (2 32 ) by using Rabin's root nding algorithm. By using more chosen plaintext, we can uniquely determine K m .
It will be interesting if we can extend our method to the probabilistic interpolation attack 3] which succeeds even if F(K; x) is approximated by a low degree polynomial.
